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Abstract
This article deals with adversarial attacks to-
wards deep learning systems for Natural Lan-
guage Processing (NLP), in the context of pri-
vacy protection. We study a specific type of at-
tack: an attacker eavesdrops on the hidden rep-
resentations of a neural text classifier and tries
to recover information about the input text.
Such scenario may arise in situations when
the computation of a neural network is shared
across multiple devices, e.g. some hidden rep-
resentation is computed by a user’s device and
sent to a cloud-based model. We measure the
privacy of a hidden representation by the abil-
ity of an attacker to predict accurately specific
private information from it and characterize
the tradeoff between the privacy and the util-
ity of neural representations. Finally, we pro-
pose several defense methods based on modi-
fied training objectives and show that they im-
prove the privacy of neural representations.
1 Introduction
This article presents an adversarial scenario meant
at characterizing the privacy of neural representa-
tions for NLP tasks, as well as defense methods
designed to improve the privacy of those represen-
tations. A deep neural network constructs inter-
mediate hidden representations to extract features
from its input. Such representations are trained to
predict a label, and therefore should contain use-
ful features for the final prediction. However, they
might also encode information about the input that
a user wants to keep private (e.g. personal data)
and can be exploited for adversarial usages.
We study a specific type of attack on neural rep-
resentations: an attacker eavesdrops on the hidden
representations of novel input examples (that are
not in the training set) and tries to recover informa-
tion about the content of the input text (Figure 1).
A typical scenario where such attacks would oc-
cur is when the computation of a deep neural net
Latent representation,
sent over a channel
z
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Output
Figure 1: General setting illustration. The main classi-
fier predicts a label y from a text x, the attacker tries to
recover some private information z contained in x from
the latent representation used by the main classifier.
is shared between several devices (Li et al., 2017).
For example, a user’s device computes a represen-
tation of a textual input, and sends it a to cloud-
based neural network to obtain, e.g. the topic of
the text or its sentiment. The scenario is illustrated
in Figure 1.
Private information can take the form of key
phrases explicitly contained in the text. However,
it can also be implicit. For example, demographic
information about the author of a text can be pre-
dicted with above chance accuracy from linguistic
cues in the text itself (Rosenthal and McKeown,
2011; Preot¸iuc-Pietro et al., 2015).
Independently of its explicitness, some of this
private information correlates with the output la-
bels, and therefore will be learned by the network.
In such a case, there is a tradeoff between the util-
ity of the representation (measured by the accu-
racy of the network) and its privacy. It might be
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necessary to sacrifice some accuracy in order to
satisfy privacy requirements.
However, this is not the case of all private in-
formation, since some of it is not relevant for the
prediction of the text label. Still, private infor-
mation might be learned incidentally. This non-
intentional and incidental learning also raises pri-
vacy concerns, since an attacker with an access to
the hidden representations, may exploit them to re-
cover information about the input.
In this paper we explore the following situation:
(i) a main classifier uses a deep network to predict
a label from textual data; (ii) an attacker eaves-
drops on the hidden layers of the network and tries
to recover information about the input text of un-
seen examples. In contrast to previous work about
neural networks and privacy (Papernot et al., 2016;
Carlini et al., 2018) we do not protect the privacy
of examples from the training set, but the privacy
of unseen examples provided, e.g., by a user.
An example of a potential application would be
a spam detection service with the following con-
straints: the service provider does not access ver-
batim emails sent to users, only their vector repre-
sentations. Theses vector representations should
not be usable to gather information about the
user’s contacts or correspondents, i.e. protect the
user from profiling.
This paper makes the following contributions:1
• We propose a metric to measure the privacy
of the neural representation of an input for
Natural Language Processing tasks. The met-
ric is based on the ability of an attacker to
recover information about the input from the
latent representation only.
• We present defense methods designed against
this type of attack. The methods are based
on modified training objectives and lead to an
improved privacy-accuracy tradeoff.
2 Adversarial Scenario
In the scenario we propose, each example consists
of a triple (x, y, z), where x is a natural language
text, y is a single label (e.g. topic or sentiment),
and z is a vector of private information contained
in x. Our base setting has two entities: (i) a main
classifier whose role is to learn to predict y from
x, (ii) an attacker who learns to predict z from the
1The source code used for the experiments described
in this paper is available at https://github.com/
mcoavoux/pnet.
latent representation of x used by the main classi-
fier. We illustrate this setting in Figure 1.
In order to evaluate the utility and privacy of a
specific model, we proceed in three phases:
Phase 1. Training of the main classifier on
(x, y) pairs and evaluation of its accuracy;
Phase 2. Generation of a dataset of pairs
(r(x), z) for the attacker, r is the representation
function of the main classifier (r is defined in Sec-
tion 2.1);
Phase 3. Training of the attacker’s network and
evaluation of its performance for measuring pri-
vacy.
In the remainder of this section, we describe the
main classifier (Section 2.1), and the attacker’s
model (Section 2.2).
2.1 Text Classifier
As our base model, we chose a standard LSTM
architecture (Hochreiter and Schmidhuber, 1997)
for sequence classification. LSTM-based archi-
tectures have been applied to many NLP tasks,
including sentiment classification (Wang et al.,
2016) and text classification (Zhou et al., 2016).
First, an LSTM encoder computes a fixed-size
representation r(x) from a sequence of tokens
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) projected to an embedding
space. We use θr to denote the parameters used
to construct r. They include the parameters of the
LSTM, as well as the word embeddings. Then, the
encoder output r(x) is fed as input to a feedfor-
ward network with parameters θp that predicts the
label y of the text, with a softmax output activa-
tion. In the standard setting, the model is trained to
minimize the negative log-likelihood of y labels:
Lm(θr,θp) =
N∑
i=1
− logP (y(i)|x(i);θr,θp),
where N is the number of training examples.
2.2 Attacker’s Classifier
Once the main model has been trained, we assume
that its parameters θr and θp are fixed. We gen-
erate a new dataset made of pairs (r(x), z(x)),
where r(x) is the hidden representation used by
the main model and z(x) is a vector of private cat-
egorical variables. In practice, z is a vector of bi-
nary variables, (representing e.g. demographic in-
formation about the author). In our experiments,
we use the same training examples x for the main
classifier and the classifier of the attacker. How-
ever, since the attacker has access to the repre-
sentation function r parameterized by θr, they can
generate a dataset from any corpus containing the
private variables they want to recover. In other
words, it is not necessary that they have access to
the original training corpus to train their classifier.
The attacker trains a second feedforward net-
work on the new dataset {(r(x(i)), z(i))}i≤N . This
classifier uses a sigmoid output activation to com-
pute the probabilities of each binary variable in z:
P (z|r(x);θa) = σ(FeedForward(r(x))).
It is trained to minimize the negative log-
likelihood of z:
La(θa) =
N∑
i=1
− logP (z(i)|r(x(i));θa)
=
N∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
− logP (z(i)j |r(x(i));θa),
assuming that the K variables in z are indepen-
dent. Since the parameters used to construct r are
fixed, the attacker only acts upon its own parame-
ters θa to optimize this loss.
We use the performance of the attacker’s clas-
sifier as a proxy for privacy. If its accuracy is
high, then an eavesdropper can easily recover in-
formation about the input document. In contrast,
if its accuracy is low (i.e. close to that of a most-
frequent label baseline), then we may reasonably
conclude that r does not encode enough informa-
tion to reconstruct x, and mainly contains infor-
mation that is useful to predict y.
In general, the performance of a single attacker
does not provide sufficient evidence to conclude
that the input representation r is robust to an at-
tack. It should be robust to any type of reconstruc-
tion method. In the scope of this paper though,
we only experiment with a feedforward network
reconstructor, i.e. a powerful learner.
In the following sections, we propose several
training method modifications aimed at obfuscat-
ing private information from the hidden represen-
tation r(x). Intuitively, the aim of these modifica-
tions is to minimize some measure of information
between r and z to make the prediction of z hard.
An obvious choice for that measure would be the
Mutual Information (MI) between r and z. How-
ever, MI is hard to compute due to the continuous
distribution of r and does not lend itself well to
stochastic optimization.
3 Defenses Against Adversarial Attacks
In this section, we present three training methods
designed as defenses against the type of attack we
described in Section 2.2. The first two methods are
based on two neural networks with rival objective
functions (Section 3.1). The last method is meant
at discouraging the model to cluster together train-
ing examples with similar private variables z (Sec-
tion 3.2).
3.1 Adversarial Training
First, we propose to frame the training of the main
classifier as a two-agent process: the main agent
and an adversarial generator, exploiting a set-
ting similar to Generative Adversarial Networks
(GAN, Goodfellow et al., 2014). The generator
learns to reconstruct examples from the hidden
representation, whereas the main agent learns (i)
to perform its main task (ii) to make the task of
the generator difficult.
We experiment with two types of generators: a
classifier that predicts the binary attributes z(x)
used as a proxy for the reconstruction of x (Sec-
tion 3.1.1) and a character-based language model
that directly optimizes the likelihood of the train-
ing examples (Section 3.1.2).
3.1.1 Adversarial Classification:
Multidetasking
In order not to make r(x) a good representation
for reconstructing z, we make two modifications
to the training setup of the main model (Phase 1):
• We use a duplicate adversarial classifier,
with parameters θ′a, that tries to predict z
from r(x). It is trained simultaneously with
the main classifier. Its training examples are
generated on the fly, and change overtime as
the main classifier updates its own parame-
ters. This classifier simulates an attack dur-
ing training.
• We modify the objective function of the main
classifier to incorporate a penalty when the
adversarial classifier is good at reconstruct-
ing z. In other words, the main classifier tries
to update its parameters so as to confuse the
duplicate attacker.
Formally, for a single data point (x, y, z), the
adversarial classifier optimizes:
La′(x, y, z;θ′a)= − logP (z|r(x);θ′a),
whereas the main classifier optimizes:
Lm(x, y, z;θr,θp)= − α logP (y|x;θr,θp)
− β logP (¬z|r(x);θ′a).
The first term of this equation is the log-likelihood
of the y labels. The second term is designed to de-
ceive the adversary. The hyperparameters α > 0
and β > 0 control the relative importance of both
terms.
As in a GAN, the losses of both classifiers are
interdependent, but their parameters are distinct:
the adversary can only update θ′a and the main
classifier can only update θr and θp.
The duplicate adversarial classifier is identical
to the classifier used to evaluate privacy after the
main model has been trained and its parameters
are fixed. However, both classifiers are completely
distinct: the former is used during the training of
the main model (Phase 1) to take privacy into ac-
count whereas the latter is used to evaluate the pri-
vacy of the final model (Phase 3), as is described
in Section 2.
3.1.2 Adversarial Generation
The second type of generator we use is a character-
based LSTM language model that is trained to re-
construct full training examples. For a single ex-
ample (x; y), the hidden state of the LSTM is ini-
tialized with r(x), computed by the main model.
The generator optimizes:
Lg(x, y;θ`;θr) = − logP (x|r(x);θ`)
= −
C∑
i=1
logP (xi|xi−11 , r(x);θ`),
where θ` is the set of parameters of the LSTM
generator, xi is the ith character in the document,
and C is the length of the document in number
of characters. The generator has no control over
r(x), and optimizes the objective only by updat-
ing its own parameters θ`.
Conversely, the loss of the main model is modi-
fied as follows:
Lm(x, y;θr,θp)= − α logP (y|x;θr,θp)
− βLg(x, y;θ`,θr).
The first term maximizes the likelihood of the y
labels whereas the second term is meant at mak-
ing the reconstruction difficult by maximizing the
loss of the generator. As in the loss function de-
scribed in the previous section, α and β control
the relative importance of both terms. Once again,
the main classifier can optimize the second term
only by updating θr, since it has no control over
the parameters of the adversarial generator.
A key property of this defense method is that it
has no awareness of what the private variables z
are. Therefore, it has the potential to protect the
neural representation against an attack on any pri-
vate information. From a broader perspective, the
goal of this defense method is to specialize the hid-
den representation r(x) to the task at hand (sen-
timent or topic prediction) and to avoid learning
anything not relevant to it.
3.2 Declustering
The last strategy we employ to make the task of the
attacker harder is based on the intuition that pri-
vate variables z are easier to predict from r when
the main model learns implicitly to cluster exam-
ples with similar z in the same regions of the rep-
resentation space.
In order to avoid such implicit clustering, we
add a term to the training objective of the main
model that penalizes pairs of examples (x, x′) that
(i) have similar reconstructions z(x) ≈ z(x′) (ii)
have hidden representations r(x) and r(x′) in the
same region of space. We use the following modi-
fied loss for a single example:
Lm(x, y, z;θr,θp) = − logP (y|x;θr,θp)
+α(0.5− `(z, z′))||r(x)− r(x′)||22,
where (x′, z′) is another example sampled uni-
formly from the training set, α is a hyperparame-
ter controlling the importance of the second term,
and `(·, ·) ∈ [0, 1] is the normalized Hamming dis-
tance.
4 Experiments
Our experiments are meant to characterize the
privacy-utility tradeoff of neural representations
on text classification tasks, and evaluating if the
proposed defense methods have a positive im-
pact on it. We first describe the datasets we
used (Section 4.1) and the experimental protocol
(Section 4.2), then we discuss the results (Sec-
tion 4.3). We found that in the normal train-
ing regime, where no defense is taken into ac-
count, the adversary can recover private informa-
tion with higher accuracy than a most frequent
class baseline. Furthermore, we found that the de-
Dataset Train Dev Test
TP US 22142 2767 2767
TP Germany 12596 1574 1574
TP Denmark 82193 10274 10274
TP France 9136 1141 1141
TP UK 48647 6080 6080
AG news 11657 1457 1457
DW corpus 5435 1772 1830
Blog posts 5144 642 642
Table 1: Sizes of datasets in number of examples.
fenses we implemented have a positive effect on
the accuracy-privacy tradeoff.
4.1 Datasets
We experiment with two text classification tasks:
sentiment analysis (Section 4.1.1) and topic clas-
sification (Section 4.1.2). The sizes of each dataset
are summarized in Table 1.
4.1.1 Sentiment Analysis
We use the Trustpilot dataset (Hovy et al., 2015)
for sentiment analysis. This corpus contains re-
views associated with a sentiment score on a five
point scale, and self-reported information about
the users. We use the five subcorpora correspond-
ing to five areas (Denmark, France, Germany,
United Kingdom, United States).
We filter examples containing both the birth
year and gender of the author of the review and use
these variables as the private information. As in
previous work on this dataset (Hovy, 2015; Hovy
and Søgaard, 2015), we bin the age of the author
into two categories (‘under 35’ and ‘over 45’). Fi-
nally, we randomly split each subcorpus into a
training set (80%), a development set (10%) and
a test (10%).
As an additional experimental setting, we use
both demographic variables (gender and age) as
input to the main model. We do so by adding two
additional tokens at the beginning of the input text,
one for each variable. It has been shown that those
variables can be used to improve text classifica-
tion (Hovy, 2015). Also, we would like to evalu-
ate whether the attacker’s task is easier when the
variables to predict are explicitly in the input, com-
pared to when these information are only poten-
tially and implicitly in the input. In other words,
this setting simulates the case where private in-
formation may be used by the model to improve
classification, but should not be exposed too obvi-
ously. In the rest of this section, we use RAW to
denote the setting where only the raw text is used
as input and +DEMO, the setting where the demo-
graphic variables are also used as input.
4.1.2 Topic Classification
We perform topic classification on two genres of
documents: news articles and blog posts.
News article For topic classification of news ar-
ticle, we use two datasets: the AG news corpus2
(Del Corso et al., 2005) and the English part of the
Deutsche Welle (DW) news corpus (Pappas and
Popescu-Belis, 2017).
For the AG corpus, following Zhang et al.
(2015), we construct the dataset by extracting doc-
uments belonging to the four most frequent topics,
and use the concatenation of the ‘title’ and ‘de-
scription’ fields as the input to the classifier. We
randomly split the corpus into a training set (80%),
a development set (10%) and a test set (10%). For
the DW dataset, we use the ‘text’ field as input,
and the standard split. We kept only documents
belonging to the 20 most frequent topics.
The attacker tries to detect which named enti-
ties appear in the input text (each coefficient in
z(x) indicates whether a specific named entity oc-
curs in the text). For both datasets, we used the
named entity recognition system from the NLTK
package (Bird et al., 2009) to associate each ex-
ample with the list of named entities that occur in
it. We select the five most frequent named entities
with type ‘person’, and only keep examples con-
taining at least one of these named entities. This
filtering is necessary to avoid a very unbalanced
dataset (since each selected named entity appears
usually in very few articles).
Blog posts We used the blog authorship corpus
presented by Schler et al. (2006), a collection of
blog posts associated with the age and gender of
the authors, as provided by the authors themselves.
Since the blog posts have no topic annotation, we
ran the LDA algorithm (Blei et al., 2003) on the
whole collection (with 10 topics). The LDA out-
puts a distribution on topics for each blog post.
We selected posts with a single dominating topic
(> 80%) and discarded the other posts. We binned
age into two category (under 20 and over 30). We
2http://www.di.unipi.it/˜gulli/AG_
corpus_of_news_articles.html
Baselines Best adversaries
Lower bound (most Upper bound
frequent class) (trained) +DEMO RAW
Gender Age Gender Age Gender Age Gender Age
TP (Denmark) 61.6 58.4 70.5 78.0 68.5 75.3 62.0 63.4
TP (France) 61.0 50.1 69.0 63.4 61.0 57.1 61.0 60.6
TP (Germany) 75.2 50.9 75.2 75.2 75.2 60.4 75.2 58.6
TP (UK) 58.8 56.7 70.0 76.3 66.4 63.5 59.9 61.8
TP (US) 63.5 63.7 74.1 74.8 81.3 74.9 64.7 63.9
Blogs 50.0 50.3 65.7 56.1 - - 63.9 55.8
Table 2: Comparisons between baselines and best adversaries. All metrics reported in this table are accuracies.
used the age and gender of the author as the private
variables. These variables have a very unbalanced
distribution in the dataset, we randomly select ex-
amples to obtain uniform distributions of private
variables. Finally, we split the corpus into a train-
ing set (80%), a validation set and a test set (10%
each).
4.2 Protocol
Evaluation For the main task, we report a single
accuracy measure. For measuring the privacy of a
representation, we compute the following metrics:
• For demographic variables (sentiment analy-
sis and blog post topic classification): 1−X ,
where X is the average of the accuracy of the
attacker on the prediction of gender and age;
• For named entities (news topic classifica-
tion): 1−F , where F is an F-score computed
over the set of binary variables in z that in-
dicate the presence of named entities in the
input example.
Training protocol We implemented our model
using Dynet (Neubig et al., 2017). The feedfor-
ward components (both of the main model and of
the attacker) have a single hidden layer of 64 units
with a ReLU activation. Word embeddings have
32 units. The LSTM encoder has a single layer of
varying sizes, since it is expected that the amount
of information that can be learned depends on the
size of these representations. We used the Adam
optimizer (Kingma and Ba, 2014) with the default
learning rate, and 0.2 dropout rate for the LSTM.
We used α = 0.1 for the declustering method,
based on preliminary experiments. For the other
defense methods, we used α = β = 1 and did not
experiment with other values.
For each dataset, and each LSTM state di-
mension ({8, 16, 32, 64, 128}), we train the main
model for 8 epochs (sentiment classification) or
16 epochs (topic classification), and select the
model with the best accuracy on the development
set. Then, we generate the dataset for the attacker,
train the adversarial model for 16 epochs and se-
lect the model with the worst privacy on the devel-
opment set (i.e. the most successful attacker).
It has to be noted that we select the models that
implement defenses on their accuracy, rather than
their privacy or a combination thereof. In prac-
tice, we could also base the selection strategy on a
privacy budget: selecting the most accurate model
with privacy above a certain threshold.
4.3 Results
This section discusses results for the sentiment
analysis task (Section 4.3.1) and the topic classi-
fication task (Section 4.3.2).
4.3.1 Sentiment Analysis
How private are neural representations? Be-
fore discussing the effect of proposed defense
methods, we motivate empirically our approach by
showing that adversarial models can recover pri-
vate information with reasonable accuracy when
the attack is targeted towards a model that imple-
ments none of the presented defense methods.
To do so, we compare the accuracy of adversar-
ial models to two types of baselines:
• As a lower bound, we use the most frequent
class baseline.
• As an upper bound, we trained a classi-
fier that can optimize the hidden represen-
tations (r) for the attacker’s tasks. In other
words, this baseline is trained to predict de-
Corpus Standard M-Detask. A-Gener. Decl. α = 0.1
Main Priv. Main Priv. Main Priv. Main Priv.
Germany 85.1 32.2 -0.6 -0.3 -1.3 +0.6 -0.8 +1.9
baseline 78.6 36.9
Denmark 82.6 28.1 -0.2 +4.4 -0.1 +6.0 -0.3 +7.6
baseline 70.4 40.0
France 75.1 41.1 -0.8 +0.7 -1.4 -6.4 -1.5 -18.2
baseline 69.2 44.4
UK 87.0 39.3 -0.5 +0.9 -0.2 +0.2 -0.1 +0.3
baseline 77.1 42.2
US 85.0 33.9 -0.1 +2.6 -0.2 +1.8 +0.7 +2.2
baseline 79.4 36.4
Table 3: Results on the test sets of the Trustpilot
dataset, +DEMO setting. Main is the accuracy on senti-
ment analysis. Priv. is the privacy measure (i.e. the in-
verse accuracy of the attacker: higher is better, see Sec-
tion 4.2). The baselines are most-frequent class clas-
sifiers. The values reported for the defense methods
indicate absolute differences with the standard training
regime (no defense implemented) for both metrics.
mographic variables from x, as if it were the
main task.
In Table 2, we compare both baselines to the
best adversary in the two settings (RAW and
+DEMO) among the models trained with no de-
fenses. First of all, we observe that apart from
gender on the German dataset, the trained baseline
outperforms the most frequent class baseline by a
wide margin (8 to 25 absolute difference). Sec-
ond of all, the attacker is able to outperform the
most frequent class baseline overall, even in the
RAW setting. In more details, for age, the adver-
sary is well over the baseline in all cases except
US. On the other hand, gender seems harder to
predict: the adversary outperforms the most fre-
quent class baseline only in the +DEMO setting.
The same pattern is visible for the blog post
dataset, also presented in the last line of Table 2:
the best adversaries are 14 points over the base-
line for gender and 5 points for age, i.e. almost
as good as a model that can fine tune the hidden
representations.
These results justify our approach, since they
demonstrate that hidden representations learn pri-
vate information about the input, and can be ex-
ploited to recover this information with reasonable
accuracy.
Effect of defenses We report results for the main
task accuracy and the representation privacy in Ta-
ble 3 for the +DEMO setting and in Table 4 for
the RAW setting. Recall that the privacy measure
Corpus Standard M-Detask. A-Gener. Decl. α = 0.1
Main Priv. Main Priv. Main Priv. Main Priv.
Germany 85.5 32.1 +0.3 +0.5 -0.8 +0.9 -1.7 +2.2
baseline 78.6 36.9
Denmark 82.3 37.3 -0.6 +0.6 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1
baseline 70.4 40.0
France 72.7 40.6 +1.8 -0.1 +1.9 -0.4 -0.3 -0.1
baseline 69.2 44.4
UK 86.9 40.1 -0.2 +1.0 -0.0 +1.2 -0.0 0.0
baseline 77.1 42.2
US 84.5 36.1 -1.1 +0.2 +0.5 +0.1 +0.3 +0.5
baseline 79.4 36.4
Table 4: Results on the test sets of the Trustpilot
dataset, RAW setting. See Section 4.2 and caption of
Table 3 for details about the metrics.
Corpus Standard M-Detask. A-Gener. Decl. α = 0.1
Main Priv. Main Priv. Main Priv. Main Priv.
AG news 76.5 33.7 -14.5 +14.5 +0.2 -7.8 -2.5 +8.6
baseline 57.8
DW news 44.3 78.3 -5.7 +21.7 +5.9 +13.1 -5.4 +18.4
baseline 22.1
Blogs 58.3 40.8 -0.8 +3.4 +1.1 +0.9 -0.2 +1.2
baseline 47.8 49.8
Table 5: Results for topic classification (test sets). See
Section 4.2 and caption of Table 3 for details about the
metrics.
(Priv.) is computed by 1 − X where X is the av-
erage accuracy of the attacker on gender and age
predictions. When this privacy metric is higher,
it is more difficult to exploit the hidden repre-
sentation of the network to recover information
about x. The ‘Standard’ columns contain the ac-
curacy and privacy of the base model described
in Section 2. The next columns present the abso-
lute variation in accuracy and privacy for the three
defense methods presented in Section 3: Multi-
detasking, Adversarial Generation, and Decluster-
ing. We also report for each corpus the most fre-
quent class baseline for the main task accuracy,
and the privacy of the most frequent class base-
lines on private variables (i.e. the upper bound for
privacy).
The three modified training methods designed
as defenses have a positive effect on privacy. De-
spite a model selection based on accuracy, they
lead to an improvement in privacy on all datasets,
except on the France subcorpus. In most cases, we
observe only a small decrease in accuracy, or even
an improvement at times (e.g. multidetasking on
the Germany dataset, RAW setting), thus improv-
ing the tradeoff between the utility and the privacy
of the text representations.
4.3.2 Topic Classification
We report results on topic classification in Table 5.
News articles For the news corpora, the privacy
metric is based on the F-score on the binary vari-
ables z indicating the presence or absence of a
named entity in the text. First of all, we ob-
serve that defense methods that explicitly use z
(i.e. multidetasking and declustering), have a very
positive effect on privacy, but also a detrimental
effect on the main task. We hypothesize that this
is due to the strong correlations between the main
task labels y and the private information z. As a
result, improving the privacy of the neural repre-
sentations comes at a cost in accuracy.
In contrast, the adversarial generation defense
method lead to an improvement in accuracy, that
is quite substantial for the DW corpus. We specu-
late that this is due to the secondary term in the ob-
jective function of the main model (Section 3.1.2)
that helps avoiding overfitting the main task or
learning spurious features.
Blog posts On the blog post dataset, the effects
are smaller, which we attribute to the nature of the
task of the attacker. The defense methods con-
sistently improve privacy and, in one case, accu-
racy. The best effects on the tradeoff are achieved
with the multidetasking and adversarial generation
methods.
5 Discussion
The main result of our experiments is that the de-
fenses we propose improve privacy with usually a
small effect, either positive or negative, on accu-
racy, thus improving the tradeoff between the util-
ity and the privacy of neural representations.
An important direction for future work is the
choice of a strategy for model selection. The
tradeoff between utility and privacy can be con-
trolled in many ways. For example, the impor-
tance of both terms in the loss functions in Sec-
tion 3.1 can be controlled to favor either privacy
or utility. In the scope of this paper, we did not
perform thorough hyperparameter tuning, but be-
lieve that doing so is important for achieving better
results, since the effects of defense method can be
more drastic than desired in some cases, as exem-
plified on the news corpora (Table 5).
Overall, we found that the multidetasking ap-
proach lead to the more stable improvements and
should be preferred in most cases, since it is also
the less computationnally expensive defense. On
the other hand, the adversarial generation method
does not require the specification of private vari-
ables, and thus is a more general approach.
6 Related Work
The deployment of machine learning in both
academic and industrial contexts raises concerns
about adversarial uses of machine learning, as well
as concerns about attacks specifically targeted at
these algorithms that often rely on large amounts
of data, including personal data.
More generally, the framework of differential
privacy (Dwork, 2006) provides privacy guaran-
tees for the problem of releasing information with-
out compromising confidential data, and usually
involves adding noise in the released information.
It has been applied to the training of deep learning
models (Abadi et al., 2016; Papernot et al., 2016;
Papernot et al., 2018), and Bayesian topic models
(Schein et al., 2018).
The notion of privacy is particularly crucial to
NLP, since it deals with textual data, oftentimes
user-generated data, that contain a lot of private in-
formation. For example, textual data contain a lot
of signal about authors (Hovy and Spruit, 2016).
and can be leveraged to predict demographic vari-
ables (Rosenthal and McKeown, 2011; Preot¸iuc-
Pietro et al., 2015). Oftentimes, this information
is not explicit in the text but latent and related to
the usage of various linguistic traits. Our work is
based on a stronger hypothesis: this latent infor-
mation is still present in vectorial representations
of texts, even if the representations have not been
supervised by these latent variables.
Li et al. (2017) study the privacy of unsuper-
vised representations of images, and measures
their privacy with the peak signal to noise ratio
between an original image and its reconstruction
by an attacker. They find a tradeoff between the
privacy of the learned representations and the ac-
curacy of an image classification model that uses
these representations as inputs. Our setting is
complementary since it is applied to NLP tasks,
but explores a similar problem in the case of rep-
resentations learned with a task supervision.
A related problem is the unintended memoriza-
tion of private data from the training set and has
been addressed by Carlini et al. (2018). They
tackle this problem in the context of text gener-
ation (machine translation, language modelling).
If an attacker has access to e.g. a trained language
model, they are likely to be able to generate sen-
tences from the training set, since the language
model is trained to assign high probabilities to
those sentences. Such memorization is problem-
atic when the training data contains private infor-
mation and personal data. The experimental set-
ting we explore is different from these works: we
assume that the attacker has access to a hidden
layer of the network and tries to recover informa-
tion about an input example that is not in the train-
ing set.
In a recent study, Li et al. (2018) proposed a
method based on GAN designed to improve the
robustness and privacy of neural representations,
applied to part-of-speech tagging and sentiment
analysis. They use a training scheme with two
agents similar to our multidetasking strategy (Sec-
tion 3.1.1), and found that it made neural represen-
tations more robust and accurate. However, they
only use a single adversary to alter the training
of the main model and to evaluate the privacy of
the representations, with the risk of overestimat-
ing privacy. In contrast, once the parameters of
our main model are fixed, we train a new classifier
from scratch to evaluate privacy.
7 Conclusion
We have presented an adversarial scenario and
used it to measure the privacy of hidden repre-
sentations in the context of two NLP tasks: senti-
ment analysis and topic classification of news arti-
cle and blog posts. We have shown that in general,
it is possible for an attacker to recover private vari-
ables with higher than chance accuracy, using only
hidden representations. In order to improve the
privacy of hidden representations, we have pro-
posed defense methods based on modifications of
the training objective of the main model. Empiri-
cally, the proposed defenses lead to models with a
better privacy.
Acknowledgments
We thank the anonymous reviewers and members
of the Cohort for helpful feedback on previous ver-
sions of the article. We gratefully acknowledge the
support of the European Union under the Horizon
2020 SUMMA project (grant agreement 688139),
and the support of Huawei Technologies.
References
Martin Abadi, Andy Chu, Ian Goodfellow, H. Bren-
dan McMahan, Ilya Mironov, Kunal Talwar, and
Li Zhang. 2016. Deep learning with differential pri-
vacy. In Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Se-
curity, CCS ’16, pages 308–318, New York, NY,
USA. ACM.
Steven Bird, Ewan Klein, and Edward Loper. 2009.
Natural Language Processing with Python, 1st edi-
tion. O’Reilly Media, Inc.
David M. Blei, Andrew Y. Ng, and Michael I. Jordan.
2003. Latent dirichlet allocation. Journal of Ma-
chine Learning Research, 3:993–1022.
Nicholas Carlini, Chang Liu, Jernej Kos, U´lfar Erlings-
son, and Dawn Song. 2018. The secret sharer: Mea-
suring unintended neural network memorization &
extracting secrets. CoRR, abs/1802.08232.
Gianna M. Del Corso, Antonio Gullı´, and Francesco
Romani. 2005. Ranking a stream of news. In Pro-
ceedings of the 14th International Conference on
World Wide Web, WWW ’05, pages 97–106, New
York, NY, USA. ACM.
Cynthia Dwork. 2006. Differential privacy. In 33rd
International Colloquium on Automata, Languages
and Programming, part II (ICALP 2006), volume
4052, pages 1–12, Venice, Italy. Springer Verlag.
Ian Goodfellow, Jean Pouget-Abadie, Mehdi Mirza,
Bing Xu, David Warde-Farley, Sherjil Ozair, Aaron
Courville, and Yoshua Bengio. 2014. Generative
adversarial nets. In Z. Ghahramani, M. Welling,
C. Cortes, N. D. Lawrence, and K. Q. Weinberger,
editors, Advances in Neural Information Processing
Systems 27, pages 2672–2680. Curran Associates,
Inc.
Sepp Hochreiter and Ju¨rgen Schmidhuber. 1997.
Long short-term memory. Neural computation,
9(8):1735–1780.
Dirk Hovy. 2015. Demographic factors improve clas-
sification performance. In Proceedings of the 53rd
Annual Meeting of the Association for Computa-
tional Linguistics and the 7th International Joint
Conference on Natural Language Processing (Vol-
ume 1: Long Papers), pages 752–762, Beijing,
China. Association for Computational Linguistics.
Dirk Hovy, Anders Johannsen, and Anders Søgaard.
2015. User review sites as a resource for large-
scale sociolinguistic studies. In Proceedings of the
24th International Conference on World Wide Web,
WWW ’15, pages 452–461, Republic and Canton of
Geneva, Switzerland. International World Wide Web
Conferences Steering Committee.
Dirk Hovy and Anders Søgaard. 2015. Tagging perfor-
mance correlates with author age. In Proceedings
of the 53rd Annual Meeting of the Association for
Computational Linguistics and the 7th International
Joint Conference on Natural Language Processing
(Volume 2: Short Papers), pages 483–488, Beijing,
China. Association for Computational Linguistics.
Dirk Hovy and Shannon L. Spruit. 2016. The social
impact of natural language processing. In Proceed-
ings of the 54th Annual Meeting of the Association
for Computational Linguistics (Volume 2: Short Pa-
pers), pages 591–598, Berlin, Germany. Association
for Computational Linguistics.
Diederik P. Kingma and Jimmy Ba. 2014. Adam:
A method for stochastic optimization. CoRR,
abs/1412.6980.
Meng Li, Liangzhen Lai, Naveen Suda, Vikas Chan-
dra, and David Z. Pan. 2017. Privynet: A flexible
framework for privacy-preserving deep neural net-
work training with A fine-grained privacy control.
CoRR, abs/1709.06161.
Yitong Li, Timothy Baldwin, and Trevor Cohn. 2018.
Towards robust and privacy-preserving text repre-
sentations. In Proceedings of the 56th Annual Meet-
ing of the Association for Computational Linguistics
(Volume 2: Short Papers), pages 25–30, Melbourne,
Australia. Association for Computational Linguis-
tics.
Graham Neubig, Chris Dyer, Yoav Goldberg, Austin
Matthews, Waleed Ammar, Antonios Anastasopou-
los, Miguel Ballesteros, David Chiang, Daniel
Clothiaux, Trevor Cohn, Kevin Duh, Manaal
Faruqui, Cynthia Gan, Dan Garrette, Yangfeng Ji,
Lingpeng Kong, Adhiguna Kuncoro, Gaurav Ku-
mar, Chaitanya Malaviya, Paul Michel, Yusuke
Oda, Matthew Richardson, Naomi Saphra, Swabha
Swayamdipta, and Pengcheng Yin. 2017. Dynet:
The dynamic neural network toolkit. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1701.03980.
Nicolas Papernot, Martı´n Abadi, U´lfar Erlingsson,
Ian J. Goodfellow, and Kunal Talwar. 2016. Semi-
supervised knowledge transfer for deep learning
from private training data. CoRR, abs/1610.05755.
Nicolas Papernot, Shuang Song, Ilya Mironov, Ananth
Raghunathan, Kunal Talwar, and U´lfar Erlingsson.
2018. Scalable Private Learning with PATE. ArXiv
e-prints, abs/1802.08908.
Nikolaos Pappas and Andrei Popescu-Belis. 2017.
Multilingual hierarchical attention networks for doc-
ument classification. In Proceedings of the Eighth
International Joint Conference on Natural Lan-
guage Processing (Volume 1: Long Papers), pages
1015–1025, Taipei, Taiwan. Asian Federation of
Natural Language Processing.
Daniel Preot¸iuc-Pietro, Vasileios Lampos, and Niko-
laos Aletras. 2015. An analysis of the user occupa-
tional class through twitter content. In Proceedings
of the 53rd Annual Meeting of the Association for
Computational Linguistics and the 7th International
Joint Conference on Natural Language Processing
(Volume 1: Long Papers), pages 1754–1764, Bei-
jing, China. Association for Computational Linguis-
tics.
Sara Rosenthal and Kathleen McKeown. 2011. Age
prediction in blogs: A study of style, content, and
online behavior in pre- and post-social media gen-
erations. In Proceedings of the 49th Annual Meet-
ing of the Association for Computational Linguis-
tics: Human Language Technologies, pages 763–
772, Portland, Oregon, USA. Association for Com-
putational Linguistics.
Aaron Schein, Zhiwei Steven Wu, Mingyuan Zhou,
and Hanna Wallach. 2018. Locally Private Bayesian
Inference for Count Models. ArXiv e-prints,
abs/1803.08471.
Jonathan Schler, Moshe Koppel, Shlomo Argamon,
and James Pennebaker. 2006. Effects of age and
gender on blogging. In Computational Approaches
to Analyzing Weblogs - Papers from the AAAI Spring
Symposium, Technical Report, volume SS-06-03,
pages 191–197.
Yequan Wang, Minlie Huang, Xiaoyan Zhu, and
Li Zhao. 2016. Attention-based LSTM for aspect-
level sentiment classification. In Proceedings of the
2016 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natu-
ral Language Processing, pages 606–615, Austin,
Texas. Association for Computational Linguistics.
Xiang Zhang, Junbo Zhao, and Yann LeCun. 2015.
Character-level convolutional networks for text clas-
sification. In C. Cortes, N. D. Lawrence, D. D. Lee,
M. Sugiyama, and R. Garnett, editors, Advances in
Neural Information Processing Systems 28, pages
649–657. Curran Associates, Inc.
Peng Zhou, Zhenyu Qi, Suncong Zheng, Jiaming Xu,
Hongyun Bao, and Bo Xu. 2016. Text classification
improved by integrating bidirectional lstm with two-
dimensional max pooling. In Proceedings of COL-
ING 2016, the 26th International Conference on
Computational Linguistics: Technical Papers, pages
3485–3495, Osaka, Japan. The COLING 2016 Or-
ganizing Committee.
